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Abstract We construct a symmetric version of the ultimatum mini game and analyze the
stability of its equilibria in the replicator dynamics. We show that the mere symmetry does
not lead to a unique social norm consistent with the observed experimental results. More-
over, the average offer in the population has to be lower than 50 % in order to have one of
the equilibria consistent with the experimental data.
Keywords Symmetric ultimatum game · Social norm · Replicator dynamics
1 Introduction
Ultimatum game is the simplest bargaining game. Its goal is to divide a unit of a certain
good between two players. The first player offers a fraction δ ∈ [0,1] of the good to the
second player. The second player can either accept the offer or reject it. In the first case, the
second player receives the payoff δ and the first player 1 − δ, while in the second case both
players receive nothing. The first player is referred to as “proposer” and the second player
as “responder”.
It is not difficult to see that in the ultimatum game any offer δ can be supported by a
Nash equilibrium. Suppose a proposer offers a share δ > 0 and a responder accepts any
offer not lower than δ. Any such pair constitutes a Nash equilibrium and consequently there
is a continuum of Nash equilibria in this game. However, if a proposer deviates from this
equilibrium and offers any positive share δ′ < δ, the best-reply strategy of a responder is to
accept it. This shows that any such equilibrium is not subgame perfect. In fact, if the good
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is infinitely divisible there is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in which a proposer
offers δ = 0 and a responder accepts any offer.1
Bargaining games were extensively tested in experiments. It seems that the first experi-
ment involving the ultimatum game was conducted in [5]. The average observed offer was
between 31 % and 35 % and so it was nowhere near the subgame-perfect equilibrium. This
experiment was replicated in [6] and in a larger design in [2, 3, 7, 14]. A detailed discussion
of these and other results is beyond the scope of this paper, a detailed survey can be found
in [11].
The notion of the Nash equilibrium does not offer any prediction for the ultimatum game.
On the other hand, the observed behavior of subjects playing the ultimatum game is different
from the prediction of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Therefore, many models have
been proposed to explain results of experiments. One strain of such models is learning ap-
proaches, cf. [1, 7, 8, 12]. Specifically, in [4] the replicator dynamics has been used to model
behavior of players in the ultimatum game. The main insight from [4] is that in the asym-
metric ultimatum game, i.e. with a population of proposers and a population of responders,
there are two asymptotically stable equilibria provided that both proposers and responders
make errors. One equilibrium is near the subgame-perfect equilibrium but at the other one
the average offer is about 20 %. It is speculated that due to a superficial similarity of the
ultimatum game to real bargaining situations, a particular social norm is triggered that leads
to initial conditions in the basin of attraction of the equilibrium supporting the experimental
results:
(. . .) we suggest that initial play reflects decision rules that have evolved in real-life
bargaining situations that are superficially similar to the Ultimatum Game. These bar-
gaining games generally feature more symmetric allocations of bargaining power than
the Ultimatum Game, yielding initial play in Ultimatum Game experiments that need
not be close to the subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Here we construct a symmetric model of the ultimatum bargaining game and use repli-
cator dynamics to test whether the symmetry of the roles leads to any significant changes as
compared to the original model in [4].
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2.1, the basic model is introduced. In Sect. 2.2,
the unperturbed version of replicator dynamics is analyzed while the perturbed version is
addressed in Sect. 2.3. We discuss our results in Sect. 3 and conclude in Sect. 4.
2 Model
We adopt the standard evolutionary setting and construct a model with a single population
of players randomly matched to play the mini ultimatum game. Since the mini ultimatum
game is an asymmetric one, the roles in the game, i.e. proposer and responder, are assigned
at random. Consequently, the position of all players ex-ante is exactly the same. We assume,
though, the conditioning of behavior on the assigned role, that is, a strategy is a plan describ-
ing a behavior in both roles. We are interested in studying the evolution of a distribution of
pure strategies (describing behavior in both roles).
1If there is a grid with a size g, then there is another subgame-perfect equilibrium at which δ = g and the
offer is accepted.
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2.1 Strategies and Payoffs
In a symmetric version of the ultimatum game, strategies of players must prescribe behavior
in both proposer and responder roles. Therefore, a strategy of a player is a pair (α,β),
where α ∈ [0,1] is an offer of a player in the role of the proposer and β ∈ [0,1] is an
acceptance level, that is, a player in the role of the responder accepts only offers not lower
than β . For simplicity we narrow down the possible offers to just three, α,∈ {0, δ,1}, where
0 < δ < 1. We also assume that acceptance levels cannot be larger than offers, that is, β ≤ α.
Consequently, we are left with six possible strategies:
Egoistic Medium Altruistic
(0, 0) (δ, δ) (1, 1)
(δ, 0) (1, δ)
(1, 0)




1 0 1 0 0 1
1 − δ 1 − δ 1 − δ 0 1 − δ 1 − δ
1 − δ 1 − δ 1 − δ 0 1 − δ 1 − δ
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0






0 0 0 0 0 0
δ δ δ 0 δ δ
δ δ δ 0 δ δ
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
for a proposer and a responder, respectively, where the first strategy is the egoistic one, then
follow two medium strategies, and finally three altruistic ones.
2.2 Unperturbed Replicator Dynamics
We consider a single population of players. They are repeatedly matched into pairs in which
their roles are attached at random. Fractions of the population using given strategies are







xi = 1, xi ≥ 0, i = 1 . . .6
}
.
Since we consider only a single population in which roles are attached randomly to play-
ers, average payoffs are given by the matrix A = (P + RT)/2, where RT is the transpose




, for i = 1, . . . ,6. (1)
where time derivatives are denoted by x˙i .
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We first notice that all altruistic strategies disappear in the long run for any interior initial






) = 0 for i = 4,5,6.
Therefore, we can consider only first three strategies. Such a game is reminiscent of the
ultimatum mini game considered in [4] with the additional strategy (δ,0). The replicator
dynamics for variables xi , i = 1,2,3 takes the following form:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x˙1 = f1(x) = 12x1(x1 − 1)(x2 − δ),
x˙2 = f2(x) = 12x1x2(x2 − δ),
x˙3 = f3(x) = 12x1x3(x2 − δ).
(2)
We write x˙ = f(x) for short, where f = (f1, f2, f3), then (2) can be written in the following
form:























The next three propositions follow directly from (3).
Proposition 1 (Equilibria) The set E of equilibria of dynamics (2) consists of four compo-
nents, E = E1 ∪E2 ∪E3 ∪E4, where E1 = {(1,0,0)}, E2 = {x ∈  : x2 = δ}, E3 = {x ∈  :
x1 = 0, x2 < δ}, and E4 = {x ∈  : x1 = 0, x2 > δ}.
Proposition 2 (Trajectories) Let x0 ∈  be an initial condition. The trajectory {x ∈  : x =
ξ(x0, t), t ≥ 0} of (2) is contained in the straight line passing through points x0 and (1,0,0).
Proposition 3 (Stability) Equilibrium (1,0,0) is locally asymptotically stable. Each equi-
librium in E4 is Lyapunov stable. Each equilibrium in E2 ∪ E3 is unstable.
Figure 1(a) shows the phase portrait of the unperturbed replicator dynamics (2).
2.3 Perturbed Replicator Dynamics
We would like to see how equilibria and their stabilities change under perturbations of the
replicator dynamics. Following [4] we consider the situation where the original evolution
2Consider η ∈ (0,1). For any x such that x1 + x2 + x3 = η we have
d
dt
(x4 + x5 + x6) = x˙4 + x˙5 + x˙6
= 1
2
(x1 + x2 + x3 − 1)
(
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Fig. 1 Behavior of the replicator dynamics in the symmetric ultimatum bargaining mini game. Equilibria
sets are in bold
takes place with a probability 1 −  and with a small probability  strategies are chosen
randomly, that is, each one with the probability 1/3. The random choice of strategies in-
troduces the term (1/3 − xi) into the replicator dynamics and we obtain the following
perturbed version of the dynamics (2):
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩






















Let us notice that from the last two equations of (4) it follows that the segment x2 = x3 is
invariant under the flow (4). Moreover, x2 = x3 at any equilibrium. Hence we may have at
most three equilibria of (4).
Proposition 4 (Equilibria) Let  > 0 be small enough. If δ ≥ 1/2, then dynamics (4) has
only one equilibrium xˆ1 ∈ . If δ < 1/2, then dynamics (4) has three equilibria: xˆ1, xˆ2,
xˆ3 ∈ . In the limit  ↓ 0 we have
xˆ1 → (1,0,0), xˆ2 → (1 − 2δ, δ, δ) and xˆ3 → (0,1/2,1/2).
Proof Let xˆ be an equilibrium, i.e. f(xˆ, ) = 0. From f2(xˆ, ) = f3(xˆ, ) = 0 it follows that
xˆ2 = xˆ3 and therefore xˆ1 = 1−2xˆ2. We substitute this into f2(x, ) = 0 and get the following
cubic equation:







Depending on the value of δ we have two cases. For δ < 1/2, cf. Fig. 2(a), there are three
different roots of f2(x2,0) = 0, namely xˆ12 = 0, xˆ22 = δ and xˆ32 = 1/2. All these roots give
rise to stationary points of the flow (4) that are contained in . It is easy to see that for any
small enough  > 0 all these stationary points still remain in the simplex, hence there are
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Fig. 2 Behavior of the polynomial f2(x2, ). The perturbed polynomial is dashed
three equilibria for the perturbed flow f(x, ). It is clear that as  ↓ 0 we have the desired
convergence.
For δ ≥ 1/2 and  > 0, cf. Figure 2(b), there is only a single root xˆ12 () of f2(x2, ) = 0
that gives rise to a stationary point of f(x, ) that is contained in a simplex . Also here, it
is clear that as  ↓ 0 we have the desired convergence. 
As we have already mentioned, a line x2 = x3 is invariant under the perturbed dynamics.
This plays a crucial role in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Global Convergence) Let x ∈  be any initial condition and let ξ(x, t) be
the solution (4). Then ξ(x, t) converges to one of the equilibria xˆi .
Proof System (4) is a planar system and so by the Poincaré–Bendixson theorem we know
that ξ(x, t) converges either to a stationary point or a limit cycle. Therefore, in order to prove
the proposition it is enough to show that there cannot be any limit cycles.
Suppose that ξ(x, t) converges to a limit cycle defining a region γ that is invariant under
f(x, ). It is well known3 that there must be a stationary point xˆ of f(x, ) such that xˆ ∈
int(γ ). But then a limit cycle has to cross the invariant line x2 = x3 which cannot happen.

To complete the analysis of the perturbed system we focus on local phase portraits around
equilibria of (4).
Proposition 6 (Local Phase Portraits) Let δ < 1/2 and  > 0 be small enough. Equilibria
xˆ1 and xˆ3 are asymptotically stable and equilibrium xˆ2 is a saddle.
3The interior of a limit cycle is an invariant region that is homeomorphic to a disc an thus has the Euler
characteristic 1. It follows by the Poincaré–Hopf index theorem or the Lefschetz fixed-point theorem, cf. [13],
that there must be a stationary point. Alternatively, it can be proved by an iterated use of the Poincaré–
Bendixson theorem and a fact that a polynomial vector field can have only a finite number of limit cycles or
by a direct use of the result from [9, 10].
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Proof We linearize f(x, ) and calculate eigenvalues to get
λ1 = 12 ( − 1)x1(δ − x2) − ,
λ2 = 12
(
δ − (δ + 2) + ( − 1)x1(2δ − 3x2) + ( − 1)x2
)
.
Firstly, we see that, at any equilibrium, λ1 < 0 leads to




(xˆ2 − δ) > −. (5)










Inserting (6) into (5) we get xˆ2 < 2/3, a condition that is satisfied at any equilibrium.
Secondly, we notice that after substituting xˆ1 = 1 − 2xˆ2 into λ2 we get
λ2 = 12
(
6( − 1)xˆ22 − 2(2δ + 1)( − 1)xˆ2 + δ( − 1) − 2
) = df2(xˆ2, )
dx2
. (7)
Direct inspection of f2(x2, ) shows, cf. Fig. 2, that λ2 is negative at both xˆ1 and xˆ3 and
positive at xˆ2. 
The case of δ ≥ 1/2 is trivial. The proof of Proposition 6 works for the only equilibrium
xˆ1 in the case of δ ≥ 1/2 as well. We could also argue differently. We know by Proposition 5
that any trajectory converges to one of the equilibria and all of them are on a line x2 = x3.
Therefore, trajectories come arbitrarily close to this line and by the continuity of (4) their
behavior is qualitatively identical to the behavior of (4) on that line.
3 Discussion
The asymmetric noisy model introduced in [4] predicts two stable equilibria. The first one is
close to the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the ultimatum game while the other one is sub-
stantially different supporting the average offer of around 20 %. It was speculated there that
at the initial phases of an experiment, the observed behavior is driven by a social norm that
happened to be triggered by the framing of the ultimatum game. This social norm is formed
in superficially similar real-life bargaining problems where players are in a symmetric sit-
uation. In other words, the initial conditions of the replicator dynamics are likely to belong
to the basin of attraction of the non-perfect equilibrium because the triggered behavior is
formed in a (more) symmetric model.
In order to check this possibility, we constructed a symmetric model of the ultimatum
game with proposer and responder roles assigned at random hence the situation of players
is completely symmetric. So, how does our symmetric model compare? In the unperturbed
case, the behavior of the model is simple. In fact, we can justify a population using a modal
offer δ through a stable (but not asymptotically stable) equilibrium. However, we are not
satisfied with such an explanation for two reasons. Firstly, we would like to have an asymp-
totically stable equilibrium supporting the observed behavior, and secondly, in the ultra-long
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run one would expect some kind of a noise in the system. This leads us as in [4] to consider
a perturbed version of the replicator dynamics.
Behavior of the perturbed replicator dynamics is to a certain extent similar to the be-
havior of perturbed dynamics in the original ultimatum bargaining mini game. For δ < 1/2
there are three equilibria. Two asymptotically stable equilibria are connected through an un-
stable manifold of the saddle point. Equilibrium xˆ1 is the perturbed subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium and cannot be used to explain the behavior observed in experiments. There is,
however, the second asymptotically stable equilibrium xˆ3, at which most of the population
uses the social norm offer δ. This equilibrium can explain to a certain extent the behavior of
subjects playing the bargaining game in a lab.
Although, we can use the equilibrium xˆ3, there are some problems with this explanation.
Firstly, the experimental results on bargaining games vary wildly and in the context of this
work the only common observation is that the average offer is lower than 1/2. Thus to
calibrate our model for various data we would have to use different noise levels . This is a
minor problem since we can always argue that in a lab only a very small sample is observed
and this can vary even though there is a common noise level.4
There is a more serious problem with the use of the equilibrium xˆ3 as the explanation of
the observed behavior. Although this equilibrium is asymptotically stable, it is not globally
asymptotically stable. If an initial population state belongs to the basin of attraction of xˆ3
and there are only small uncorrelated jumps, then in the ultra-long time, the population
state should be near the equilibrium xˆ3. However, if there are large perturbations or a series
of correlated small perturbations, the population state may very well happen to be in the
basin of attraction of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium xˆ1. If the perturbations were
persistent, then we could observe a system jumping between equilibria which is reminiscent
of [15].
One way of estimating how likely it is for a population state to be in a given basin is
to look at the basins area. For precise calculations we would need to have formulas for the
stable manifold of the saddle point xˆ2 and these are notoriously difficult to get. However, for
δ = 1/3, the segment x2 = δ is the stable separatrix of the saddle point xˆ2 and consequently
the ratio of the area of the basin of attraction of xˆ3 to the whole simplex is 4/9. Numerical
calculations suggest that for δ < 1/3 this separatrix is to the left of the segment x2 = δ and
for δ > 1/3 it is to the right of this segment. As δ ↓ 0, the area of the basin of attraction of the
subgame-perfect equilibrium xˆ1 decreases to 0, but at the same time the difference between
offers of the egoistic strategy and the medium strategies decreases as well. If the plausibility
of a given equilibrium is measured by the size of its basin of attraction, then there is a trade
off between the plausibility of xˆ3 and how different medium strategies are from the egoistic
one.
Before we continue with final conclusions, we would like to compare closer our game
with the original one considered in [4]. The original ultimatum mini game in strategic form
reads
(δ, δ) (0, 0)
reject accept
(δ, δ) high (2, 2) (2, 2)
(0, 0) low (0, 0) (3, 1)
4However interesting, such a discussion is far beyond the scope of this note and so we only hint in this
direction herein. Many models assume some kind of a noise of behavior of players but we are not aware of
any systematic study of errors people make, whether these errors have a uniform distribution of alternatives
or if all people are similar as far as a distribution of errors is concerned.
266 Dyn Games Appl (2012) 2:258–268
Fig. 3 Behavior of the replicator dynamics in the symmetric ultimatum bargaining mini game with the
minimal offer μ = 5/100. Equilibria sets are in bold
where we overlaid our corresponding strategies. We deal with a slightly different game,
where the payoffs read
(δ, δ) (0, 0)
reject accept
(δ, δ) high (2, 2) (2, 2)
(0, 0) low (0, 0) (4, 0)
where in both matrices we use the original payoffs, i.e. players divide the pie of size 4. The
obvious difference between above two games concerns the “low offer” strategy. In the orig-
inal paper, the offer is low but still positive making rejection costly. In the game considered
herein, the low offer is just plain nothing thus the responder is indifferent between reject-
ing and accepting the offer. It is a valid question if such a change influences our results. To
answer this question we need to introduce the minimal offer which we denote by μ > 0,
i.e. α,β ∈ {μ,δ,1}, where 0 < μ < δ < 1. The introduction of the minimal offer μ does not
change the first step in our analysis, the last three strategies vanish in the long run and so we
can consider the 3 × 3 game with the first three pure strategies.
Again, as in the previous analysis, we first consider a scenario without noise. The behav-
ior of such dynamics is depicted in Fig. 3(a). The phase portrait is qualitatively similar to
the phase portrait of the previously considered dynamics depicted in Fig. 1(a). The set of
equilibria E′ is a union of four components E′ = E′1 ∪ E′2 ∪ E′3 ∪ E′4, where E′i = Ei for
i = 1,3,4 with identical stability properties. The only difference occurs with respect to the
component E2 which is reduced to just a single point E′2 = (1− δ, δ,0) and is unstable. This
phase portrait is extremely similar to the Fig. 2 in [4], p 76. In this case, an introduction of
symmetry does not lead to any substantial change regardless of the value of the minimal
offer μ.
The next step is the analysis of the perturbed dynamics. Figure 3(b) depicts the phase
portrait of the perturbed dynamics with the positive minimal offer μ > 0. Qualitatively the
situation is exactly the same as the one with a noise and μ = 0 depicted in Fig. 1(b). There
are three equilibria. The first one x˜1 is close to the first pure strategy corresponding to the
subgame perfect equilibrium of the original game and is asymptotically stable. The third one
x˜3 is also asymptotically stable equilibrium and corresponds to the xˆ3 equilibrium of the dy-
namics (4). There is an unstable equilibrium (saddle) x˜2 corresponding to the xˆ2 equilibrium
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of the dynamics (4). Also in this case the introduction of the positive minimal offer μ > 0
does not change anything qualitatively.
Introduction of the minimal positive offer μ > 0 neither influences results qualitatively
nor gives an additional insight. On the other hand, the assumption that μ = 0 simplifies
immensely calculations and this is the main reason why we decided to analyze in detail this
version of the game.
Now we ask ourselves: is there anything that we can conclude from the replicator dy-
namics of the symmetric ultimatum mini game? The only good news is that if we would like
to have any chance to explain the experimental data, we have to have δ < 1/2, a result that
goes quite well with the collected data. However, the symmetry does not lead to the creation
of the social norm, triggered by the framing of the ultimatum game during experiments,
different from the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the ultimatum game. Regardless of the
symmetry, there are still two asymptotically stable equilibria and one of them is arbitrarily
close to the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the ultimatum game. Consequently, the sym-
metry argument cannot be used to justify the appropriate initial conditions in the replicator
dynamics for the asymmetric ultimatum mini game.
4 Conclusions
We proposed an extended symmetric version of the ultimatum mini game introduced in [4].
We analyzed the global behavior of the model in both unperturbed and perturbed cases. The
main insight from the analysis presented in this paper is that the mere symmetry cannot
be solely responsible for a creation of the social norm supporting an equilibrium that is not
subgame perfect. The main problem of the model introduced in [4] is still unsolved. It seems
to us that to fully explain results of experiments one has to construct dynamics with a unique
globally asymptotically stable equilibrium consistent with the observed experimental data.
Also, it seems to us that any dynamics based on imitation, like the replicator dynamics, is
not a suitable model of learning in the context of bargaining situations. Construction of a
model based on different learning procedures with a unique globally asymptotically stable
equilibrium is left for a future research.
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